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THE CLEOPHONS IN ARISTOTLE.

THE account usually given us of the Cleophon¹ mentioned in Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric takes two things for granted, (1) that he was the tragic poet on whom Suidas has an article, and (2) that he was the author of the 'Mandrobulus' (or Mandrobolus²) to which reference is made in the Sophistici Elenchi. On the subject of this 'Mandrobulus' there is a remarkable diversity of opinion; it has been variously described as a poem, as a drama, as a tragedy, as a comedy, as an epic—and as an oration. The idea that it was possibly an oration is the suggestion of Welcker, who in his *Griechische Tragödien* (p. 1011) endeavours to prove the paradox that the Cleophon of literature was one and the same person with the Cleophon of Athenian history, the famous demagogue.

¹ Compare for instance Mr Cope's note on Rhet. 3. 7: "Κλεοφῶν] Ἀθηναῖος τραγικός. τῶν δραμάτων αὐτοῦ Ἀκταίων, Ἀμφιάραος, Ἀχιλλεύς, Βάκχαι, Δεξαμενός, Ἡριγόνη, Θυέστης, Λεύκιππος, Περσὶς, Τήλεφος, Suidas. He is omitted in Wagner's collection, *Fragm. Trag. Gr.* vol. III. We learn from Poet. II 5, that his subjects and characters were neither above nor below the level of ordinary, every-day, life and character. To the same effect it is stated in Poet. XXII 1, that his style was low or humble, ταπεινή, and devoid of all poetical ornament. Gräfenhan, ad loc. II 5. Id. ad Poet. XXII 1, 'qui humili dictione imitabatur vulgares mores.' To Suidas's list of 10 tragedies

must be added the Μανδρόβουλος, de Soph. El. 15, 174 b 27, οἷον ὁ Κλεοφῶν ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Μανδροβούλῳ, where it is quoted in illustration of a mode of argument."

² On the form Μανδρόβουλος see Meineke F. C. G. 5, p. 44. Letronne, *Mém. de l'Institut, Acad. des Inscriptions*, 19 p. 49, compares Μανδρόβουλος with Θεόβουλος, and concludes that, as the first half of the word is found in a number of Asiatic Greek names (e.g. Μανδροκλῆς, Μανδρογένης, etc.), Μάνδρος or Μάνδρα must have been the name of some Phrygian or Carian deity. Fick, *Personennamen*, p. 53, connects the name with μάνδρα = fold.

The data outside Aristotle's writings show that there were at least two Cleophons, a politician and a tragic poet. The politician is a sufficiently well-known personage: he was a demagogue of the type of Cleon and Hyperbolus (Ruhnken's *Opusc.* I p. 318; Grote's *Greece* 8 p. 166), and as such he came under the lash of the Old Comedy, and was specially attacked by Plato in his comedy, the *Κλεοφῶν* (Meineke *F. C. G.* 2 p. 634; Kock I p. 615). As regards the tragic poet on the other hand, the only direct proof of his existence is that contained in the brief notice in an article of Suidas:—*Κλεοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος τραγικός τῶν δραμάτων αὐτοῦ Ἀκταίων, Ἀμφιάραος, Ἀχιλλεύς, Βάκχαι, Δεξαμενός, Ἡριγόνη, Θυέστης, Λεύκιππος, Πέρσις* (v. Meineke *F. C. G.* I p. 497), *Τήλεφος*. Unfortunately even this information has to be used with some reserve, since we find Suidas attributing elsewhere an all but identical list of tragedies to Iophon, the son of Sophocles.

This being the sum and substance of the external data that have to be considered, I may now proceed to discuss the half-dozen passages in which the name Cleophon occurs in the pages of Aristotle. Two of these passages will give us no trouble at all, if we duly bear in mind the historical situation at Athens at the end of the Fifth Century B.C. :—

Κλεοφῶν δὲ μαχέσθω: παρόσον, ὥς Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ἀργινοῦσαις ναυμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίων βουλομένων ἐκ Δεκελείας ἀπιέναι ἐφ' οἷς ἔχουσιν ἑκάτεροι καὶ εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἐπὶ τοῦ Καλλίου, Κλεοφῶν ἔπεισε τὸν δῆμον μὴ προσδέξασθαι ἐλθὼν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μεθύων καὶ θώρακα ἐνδεδυκώς, οὐ φάσκων ἐπιτρέψειν εἰ μὴ πάσας ἀφώσι τὰς πόλεις οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Fr. 370 ed. Rose, from the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*.

Ἀθηναῖοι Ὀμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρίσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος καὶ Τενέδιοι ἔναγχος Περιάνδρῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ πρὸς Σιγειεῖς. καὶ Κλεοφῶν κατὰ Κριτίου τοῖς Σόλωνος ἐλεγείοις ἐχρήσατο λέγων ὅτι πάλαι ἀσελγὴς ἡ οἰκία· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἐποίησε Σόλων "εἰπεῖν μοι Κριτία πυρρότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν." *Rhet.* I. 15, 1375^b 30.

The second of these passages refers to something said by the demagogue Cleophon in a speech against his political opponent

Critias, one of the Thirty (Clinton F. H. 2 p. xxxv ed. 3); there cannot be much doubt on the point, when one sees Aristotle in the very next sentence quoting in precisely the same way from a speech of Themistocles.

Turning now to the places in the Poetics and Rhetoric, which have been by writer after writer—by Welcker, Wagner, Nauck, Kayser, Bernhardt and I know not how many more besides—assumed to relate to a tragic poet Cleophon, I hope to be able to show that the assumption is not justified by Aristotle's language, whose words must be understood to apply (as Rortello long ago saw clearly enough, and since him Dacier and Ritter) to a writer of epic poetry and not to a writer of tragedy. The very first statement in regard to Cleophon in the Poetics is inconsistent with the current theory about him:—

καὶ τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν (scil. ἔχει ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς?), οἷον "Ὅμηρος μὲν βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἡγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος ὁ τὰς παρωδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος καὶ Νικοχάρης ὁ τὴν Δηλιάδα χείρους. Poet. 2, 1448^a 11.

The point insisted upon here is Cleophon's realism: his picture of men and manners being neither better nor worse than the prosaic realities of our ordinary experience, he stands midway between Homer on the one side and Hegemon and the parodists on the other. That Aristotle had in view an epic poem of some sort is proved (1) by the mention of *ψιλομετρία* as the head under which the work of Cleophon comes; *ψιλομετρία* in fact is a term that excludes the possibility of its being a drama or a lyrical poem: (2) by the company in which Cleophon is placed in the text; Homer is an epic poet, and Hegemon (like Hipponax and Matro: see the fragments in Peltzer, *De parodica Graecorum poesi*) was as a parodist of Homer the writer of a base kind of epic. We have therefore two extremes, the heroic epic of Homer, and the mock-epic of Hegemon, with Cleophon as a middle-term, the epic poet of realism. Had Cleophon been regarded as a dramatist, Aristotle would have had to reserve him for consideration in a later section where the distinction between tragedy and comedy has to

be determined. The evidence of our next Aristotelian passage is of a more ambiguous kind :—

λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφὴ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴ εἶναι. σαφεστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ ταπεινὴ—παράδειγμα δὲ ἡ Κλεοφώντος ποιήσις καὶ ἡ Σθενέλου. σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν ἡ τοῖς ξενικοῖς κεχρημένη. Poet. 22, 1458^a 18.

Here Cleophon's style is condemned as mean and wanting in dignity; and he is compared in this respect with Sthenelus, a certain sorry tragic poet (Nauck T. G. F. p. 735; comp. Meineke F. C. G. 2 p. 640, Kock I p. 621). But the juxtaposition of the two names will hardly warrant the inference that Cleophon was like Sthenelus a tragic poet, as Aristotle throughout his chapters on poetic language takes his instances quite as often from epic poetry as from tragedy. I should be inclined to go further and say that, as two poets are cited as exemplifying the same defect, the presumption rather is that Aristotle does not regard them as coming under exactly the same category; so that, if the one is an instance of a bad style in tragedy, the other is probably mentioned as an instance of a bad style in a different but allied department of poetry. The presumption, that Cleophon's was a bad epic style, is borne out by the parallel in the Third Book of the Rhetoric :—

τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἡ λέξις, εἰ ἢ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἠθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασις ἀνάλογον. τὸ δ' ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴτε περὶ εὐόγων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγεται μὴτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμωδία φαίνεται· οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφών· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν αὖ “ πότνια συκὴ”. Rhet. 3. 7, 1408^a 10.

This statement reaffirms what has been already said in the two passages in the Poetics and supplements it by a very noteworthy addition—Cleophon is described as deviating now and then from his ordinary style of language in a way that produces a highly ridiculous effect. As a realist he takes his subjects from common life (περὶ εὐτελῶν λέγει = ὁμοίους ποιεῖ), and his style as a rule is on a level with his matter (τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις

πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον), but there are moments when his mean diction has an element of ornament superadded in the shape of epithets (ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ ἡ κόσμος)—with an effect as ludicrously incongruous as if he said *πότνια συκῇ*. I need hardly observe that *πότνια*, though not unknown in tragedy, belongs essentially to the ‘grand style’ of the epic, and that to a Greek it recalled Homer’s *πότνια Ἥρη, πότνια μήτηρ, πότνια Κίρκη*, and the like: the combination *πότνια συκῇ* accordingly would seem to have been invented by Aristotle with a double purpose, not merely to give us some idea of the absurdity of Cleophon’s manner but also to suggest a comparison between it and Homer’s manner. If this is the true state of the case, the criticism of Cleophon’s language comes practically to this: ‘His manner is generally, as befits his matter, mean and prosaic; and if he introduces a poetical word, as he now and then does, the result reads just like a parody of Homer.’ The Cleophon of the Poetics then must have been a poet sufficiently like Homer for Aristotle to think it worth while to note with scientific precision the differences of form and matter which really distinguish him from Homer; and, if so, the work Aristotle had in view must have been a degenerate specimen of the epic and not a tragedy. This is the general conclusion to which, as it appears to me, the three Aristotelian passages naturally point; and I suspect that a tragic Cleophon would never have been thought of, if it had not been for the supposed necessity of bringing Aristotle into harmony with the statement in Suidas. The Cleophon of Suidas, notwithstanding all that has been written about him, is still a mere name to us; there are simply no data for deciding the question whether he was identical with the Cleophon of Aristotle. If they were the same, we may say with Dacier that Cleophon must have written an epic as well as tragedies; and if they were different persons, as Robortello thinks, I imagine that there was room enough in Greek literature for them both.

So much then for two of Aristotle’s Cleophons—the Cleophon of Athenian history, and the Cleophon of poetry. A veritable ‘third wave’ has now to be faced: Who was the Cleophon of the Sophistici Elenchi, and what had he to do with

the mysterious 'Mandrobulus' there mentioned in connexion with him? As the passage in the *Sophistici Elenchi* is somewhat obscure, and seems to have been misread by many very eminent scholars, I subjoin the translations given by Pacius and Mr Poste:—

ἔτι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενα, ἢ πρὸς οὓς ὁμολογεῖ καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν... ὥσπερ τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι πολλάκις, ὅταν ἐλέγχωνται, ποιοῦσι διττόν, ἂν μέλλῃ συμβαίνειν ἐλεγχθήσεσθαι, καὶ ἐρωτῶντας χρηστέον ποτὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνισταμένους, ἂν ὥδὲ μὲν συμβαίῃ ὥδὲ δὲ μή, ὅτι οὕτως εἵληφεν, οἷον ὁ Κλεοφῶν ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Μανδροβούλῳ. *Soph. Elench.* 15, 174^b 19.

'*Praeterea, ut in rhetoricis, ita etiam in elencticis similiter animadvertenda sunt ea quae repugnant vel iis quae ab ipso respondente dicta sunt, vel iis quos ipse fatetur recte loqui aut agere... Sicut autem qui respondent saepenumero, quando elencho redarguuntur, distinctionem adhibent, si futurum est ut elencho redarguantur: ita etiam interrogantibus utendum est hoc praesidio contra obiicentes, ut si illo modo contingit, hoc modo non contingit, illo modo se accepisse dicant, ut etiam Cleophon facit in Mandrobulo.*' Pacius, p. 823 ed. Francof. 1597.

'*Again, as in Rhetoric so in Dialectic, discrepancies should be developed between the thesis and the tenets either of the answerer or of those whom he acknowledges to be high authorities. ... And as the answerer avoids imminent confutation by drawing distinctions, so the questioner who foresees an objection that applies in one sense and not in another, should explain that he means the proposition in the unobjectionable sense, like Cleophon in the Mandrobulus.*' Poste, p. 49.

The situation here implied is a sort of dialectical disputation, with what would be termed in the technical language of the schools, a thesis, a respondent, and an opponent. The line of the opponent is to propound questions which involve a difficulty, i.e. something which appears to be incompatible with the truth of the thesis; and as the respondent may perhaps meet a per-

plexing question by saying *distinguo*, the opponent, if he foresees the possibility of a *distinguo*, should anticipate his adversary's move by stating the precise sense in which he means the words of his question to be taken, 'as Cleophon does in the Mandrobulus.'

This then is the passage which Welcker and I know not how many more besides Welcker have cited as intimating that Cleophon was the author of a writing called the Mandrobulus! Aristotle's words on the contrary show clearly enough that he was not the author of it, but a personage in it. We have to imagine a work—no doubt a dialogue—in which there was a disputation, with Cleophon as one of the disputants, the opponent of some unnamed respondent. His procedure as a disputant is characterized as that of Thrasymachus in the Republic or that of Callicles in the Gorgias might be characterized; the mode of reference to him being just what we should expect in a case when Aristotle wishes to refer to a personage in a dialogue: compare, for instance,

ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργία γέγραπται λέγων.
Soph. Elench. 12, 173^a 8.

καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην. Pol. 2. 4, 1262^b 11.

ὁ γὰρ λέγει <ὁ> Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ ἀληθές. Rhet. 3. 14, 1415^b 30.

Aristotle's way of quoting from dialogues is known to us from his references to the dialogues of Plato (comp. Ueberweg, *Untersuchungen*, p. 140). His quotations from Plato are generally speaking of two kinds, (1) those in which a statement in Plato is assumed to represent the Platonic theory on a certain point—in which case Πλάτων φησί or something of the same type is the formula used; and (2) those in which the statement quoted is still viewed as part of the dramatic situation in the dialogue, so that it may or may not represent Plato's own opinion on the matter under discussion—in which case ὁ Σωκράτης φησί or ὁ Καλλικλῆς φησι is the sort of formula used¹. Any one who has

¹ See Sir A. Grant's note on Eth. Nic. vi. 13, 3.

to deal with a work in a dramatic form, a dialogue or a play for instance, finds it necessary from time to time to distinguish between the writer himself and the *dramatis personae* of his work: we are obliged for the moment to treat the personages as though they were independent of the writer, e.g. when we say: 'Polonius in Hamlet gives his son some excellent words of advice'—though we know perfectly well that the words are really not Polonius' words but Shakespeare's. Now this is precisely what Aristotle does in the case of the *Mandrobulus*. He says in effect: 'In a disputation the opponent should meet a certain move on the part of the respondent in a certain way, as Cleophon does in the *Mandrobulus*', just as we might say: 'A fool may give excellent advice to another, as Polonius does in Hamlet'. Here it would be absurd to say 'as Shakespeare does in Hamlet'; and it is no less absurd to suppose Cleophon in the analogous case to be quoted as being the author of the *Mandrobulus*. Had Aristotle meant Cleophon to be regarded as the author of the book, he would have expressed himself differently and given us something like this: 'As Cleophon makes So-and-so do in the *Mandrobulus*'—οἶον τὸν * * Κλεοφῶν γέγραφε ποιοῦντα ἐν τῷ Μανδροβούλῳ.

We see then (1) that the *Mandrobulus* of the *Sophistici Elenchi* must have been a dialogue, and (2) that the Cleophon mentioned was not the author but merely one of the interlocutors. This result has been arrived at by analysis of the Aristotelian passage, without taking anything extraneous into account. We may now perhaps look elsewhere and ascertain whether there is anything outside Aristotle that throws any light on the present question.

During recent years it has more than once been asserted (e.g. by Dindorf in *H. St.* s. v., and Susemihl on *Poet.* 2) that the *Mandrobulus* was a dialogue, but in these cases the assertion appears to rest not on the language of Aristotle but on a piece of external evidence which became known for the first time in 1842, when Spengel published the anonymous *Paraphrast on the Sophistici Elenchi* (*Incerti auctoris paraphrasis Aristotelis Sophisticorum Elenchorum*—Monachii 1842) from a Munich MS. As the Paraphrase seems to me more important

than is generally supposed, I give in extenso the portion of it that corresponds with the concluding words of the Aristotelian passage with which we are now dealing:—

ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι ποιοῦσι πολλάκις ἐλεγχόμενοι· διαιροῦσι γὰρ ὕστερον συναισθόμενοι τῆς ἀπάτης τὸ διττόν, καὶ ὡς ἐπ' ἄλλου σημαινομένου δεδώκασιν ἢ ὁ συνῆξεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας χρηστέον ποτὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνισταμένους τῶν ἐρωτῶμένων ὡς οὐκ ἐλεγχόμενους, ἀν' ὧδὲ μὲν συμβαίνει ὧδὲ δὲ μή, ὅτι οὕτως εἴληφε καὶ προέτεινεν ἢ συνήγαγεν, οἶον ὁ Κλεοφῶν ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Μανδροβούλῳ τῷ πλατωνικῷ διαλόγῳ (p. 81).

The Paraphrast must be credited with two things: (1) he knows that the Mandrobulus was a dialogue—which no one before 1842 seems to have been able to discover for himself: (2) he knows the Cleophon mentioned to be one of the interlocutors; this I take to be sufficiently shown by the careful way in which he generally refers to personages in the dialogues of Plato:—

1. ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Εὐθύφρων καὶ Γοργίας. p. 45.

2. ὅπερ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ γέγραπται ποιῶν τῷ πλατωνικῷ διαλόγῳ. p. 71 (Aristotle has merely ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ γέγραπται λέγων).

3. ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ διαλόγῳ. p. 82.

4. ὁ τοῦ Καλλικλέους (scil. συλλογισμός) ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ. p. 134.

When one compares these passages, and more particularly the second of them, with what is here said about Cleophon and the Mandrobulus—οἶον ὁ Κλεοφῶν ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Μανδροβούλῳ τῷ πλατωνικῷ διαλόγῳ—the meaning of the Paraphrast is plain enough: he regards the Mandrobulus as a 'Platonic dialogue' just as the Gorgias is; and he regards Cleophon as one of the personages in it just in the same way as Callicles is a personage in the Gorgias, Euthyphro in the Euthyphro, and Protagoras in the Protagoras. And moreover, as he describes both the Gorgias and the Mandrobulus in

exactly the same terms, I do not see how we can avoid the conclusion that he regards the *Mandrobulus* as actually a dialogue of Plato. The work itself may have been, as Susemihl thinks, merely a dialogue of the Platonic kind, but that is certainly not what the language of the Paraphrast seems intended to intimate: for the Paraphrast the *Mandrobulus* is like the *Gorgias* a dialogue of Plato. I lay this stress on the point for an obvious reason, because his language indicates that in the opinion of the Paraphrast the Cleophon mentioned was not the author of the dialogue.

What is one to think of a man who calmly tells us that the *Mandrobulus* was a dialogue by Plato? Is the statement the 'turpe mendum,' as Spengel so contemptuously terms it, of a blundering Byzantine, or is it to be seriously considered as having presumably some basis of truth underlying it? I incline to the second alternative, partly because a Byzantine Greek, who must have known his Plato fairly and who wrote for people who had access to Plato's writings in libraries, was hardly likely to invent such a statement; and partly because the matter of the Paraphrase is at any rate here and there too good for a Byzantine grammarian; in the passage now before us for instance the Paraphrast shows a truer sense of Aristotle's meaning than a whole series of eminent modern scholars. The statement in the Paraphrase therefore must be traditional and not the invention of the Paraphrast himself. This is no doubt the view of those who have recently termed the *Mandrobulus* a dialogue; they do so on the strength of the Paraphrast's statement, but his words are obviously of no authority unless we suppose them to represent a genuine and trustworthy tradition.

The real difficulty, I need not say, is to explain how the *Mandrobulus* could be described as a dialogue of Plato. Two explanations may be imagined:—

(1) The *Mandrobulus* may have been one of the early Platonic pseudepigrapha, the work of some disciple which was popularly attributed to Plato himself. The objection to this theory is the fact that the name does not occur in the list of

Platonic pseudepigrapha in Diogenes Laertius or elsewhere (see Diog. Laert. 3. 62 with Menage's notes, and compare Ueberweg, *Untersuchungen*, p. 198).

(2) We may perhaps assume the tradition to have got somewhat out of shape by the time it reached the Byzantine Paraphrast, and thus surmise that the original form of the tradition assigned the book not to Plato but to some one else whose name was very intimately associated with that of Plato; so that in fact the phenomenon is to be regarded as due to a confusion of names.

But however the Paraphrast's words are to be explained, we may leave him to his fate and return to the main thread of the enquiry. There is still an important piece of ancient evidence to be pointed out and considered, which will, if I am not mistaken, suffice to show that the author of the *Mandrobulus* was no other than—Plato's nephew *Speusippus*.

A work entitled '*Mandrobulus*' certainly appears in the list of *Speusippus*' writings given in Diogenes Laertius (4. 4). This list is, like so many of the lists in Diogenes, a most unsatisfactory document—it is defective; it is confused through want of proper classification of the writings enumerated; and there are cases in which it is clear that one and the same work figures twice over in it. These elements of difficulty are confessedly not peculiar to the list of *Speusippus*' works, but I have thought it as well to mention them before proceeding to discuss details. The text in Diogenes is as follows:—

Καταλέλοιπε δὲ (scil. *Speusippus*) *πάμπλειστα ὑπομνήματα καὶ διαλόγους πλείονας, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἀρίστιππον τὸν Κυρηναῖον*¹. *περὶ πλούτου* ᾧ· *περὶ ἡδονῆς* ᾧ· *περὶ δικαιοσύνης*

¹ In an ordinary writer one would be tempted to bracket the clause *ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἀρίστιππον τὸν Κυρηναῖον* as an interpolation partly because of its inconsistency in point of form with what follows, and partly because we have an *Ἀρίστιππος*—doubtless the same book—later on in the list. Dio-

genes, however, is often as it were his own interpolator; he (or the authority whom he is copying) seems to have known of this *Ἀρίστιππος ὁ Κυρηναῖος* not from the *πίνακες*, but from some other source; and the addition is not wholly valueless, since it shows that the *Ἀρίστιππος* was a dialogue. It will be

ā· περι φιλοσοφίας ā· περι φιλίας ā· περι θεῶν ā· Φιλό-
 σοφος ā· πρὸς Κέφαλον ā· Κέφαλος ā· Κλεινόμαχος ἢ Λυσίας
 ā· Πολίτης ā· περι ψυχῆς ā· πρὸς Γρύλλον ā· Ἀρίστιππος ā
 περι νομοθεσίας· Μαθηματικός· Μανδρόβουλος·
 Λυσίας· ὄροι κτέ.

This list of writings is clearly 'contaminated' (see Wilamowitz-Moellendorff *Antigonos*, p. 330) and compiled from two distinct *πίνακες*. The Mandrobulus was part of the literature of the second *πίναξ*. We may recognize it as being a dialogue not merely by its name but also through its proximity to the Lysias, which can hardly be anything else than a dialogue, and which looks suspiciously like the *Κλεινόμαχος ἢ Λυσίας* of the first *πίναξ*. And besides these we cannot doubt that the *Φιλόσοφος*, the *Κέφαλος*, the *Πολίτης* and the *Ἀρίστιππος* were in like manner dialogues, so that Diogenes seems to be quite right in ascribing to Speusippus 'several dialogues.'

Assuming then that the Mandrobulus of Speusippus was a dialogue, we have still to enquire whether there is any reason to identify it with the Mandrobulus of the *Sophistici Elenchi*. Diogenes gives us no help here, but we are fortunately able to supply the missing link from Clemens Alexandrinus, who preserves a few words from a writing of Speusippus not mentioned in the list of Diogenes:—

Σπεύσιππος γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Κλεοφῶντα πρώτῳ τὰ ὅμοια τῷ Πλάτῳ ἔοικε διὰ τούτου γράφειν· Εἰ γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία σπουδαῖον ὃ τε σόφος μόνος βασιλεὺς καὶ ἄρχων, ὁ νόμος λόγος ὦν ὀρθὸς σπουδαῖος (*Strom.* 2. 4, p. 438 Potter = fr. 193, Mullach F. Ph. G. 3 p. 91).

Here then we see that there was a book *πρὸς Κλεοφῶντα*, a writing addressed by Speusippus to a certain Cleophon, a friend and contemporary (for I need not consider the alternative hypothesis, that the book was one written against Cleophon); just as we see in the list in Diogenes a book *πρὸς Κέφαλον*,

observed that the works taken from the second *πίναξ* are not described with the same bibliographical precision as those taken from the first.

a writing similarly addressed to a certain Cephalus. Now Speusippus must have put his friend Cephalus into a book, for we find a dialogue entitled the *Κέφαλος* in the immediate vicinity of the work *πρὸς Κέφαλον*. This being the case, we have only to imagine that Speusippus put his friend Cleophon also into a book, and the puzzle of the Mandrobulus is solved, as far as names and titles can enable us to solve the puzzle. If we remember the way in which the name of Cleophon is introduced in the passage in the *Sophistici Elenchi*, the analogy between the *Κέφαλος* and the *Μανδρόβουλος* seems to be pretty complete: they were each of them dialogues by Speusippus, and in each of them Speusippus brought in one of his friends as a party in the discussion of the dialogue.


To sum up this lengthy argument: I have sought to show in regard to the passage in *Soph. Elench.* 15 (1) that the Mandrobulus was a dialogue, (2) that the Cleophon mentioned was one of the personages in it, and (3) that the author was Speusippus. Beyond the fragment in the *Sophistici Elenchi* we have no data to enable us to form an idea of the Mandrobulus. The name was already familiar to Greek ears on account of the proverb *ἐπὶ τὰ Μανδροβούλου χωρεῖ*, said of one who is 'progressing backwards,' which seems to have been current at the end of the Fifth Cent. B.C. The story on which the proverb is said to be founded is thus told by the Scholiast on Lucian *De mercede conductis* 21 (p. 111 Jacobitz; comp. Kock C. A. F. I p. 615, and *Paroem. Gr.* I p. 77 ed. Gott.):—

ἐπὶ Μανδροβούλου χωρεῖ παροιμία κατὰ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον προκοπτόντων αἰεί. ὁ γὰρ Μανδρόβουλος οὗτος εὐρών ποτε θησαυρὸν ἐν Σάμῳ χρυσοῦν πρόβατον ἀνέθηκε τῇ Ἥρᾳ, τῷ δὲ δευτέρῳ ἔτει ἀργυροῦν, τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ χαλκοῦν. μέμνηται Πλάτων ὁ κωμικὸς ἐν Διὶ κακουμένῳ.

I will not speculate as to how Speusippus' dialogue got its name, though I can easily imagine the story becoming the text for a very pretty logomachy, in which one of the parties might be represented as showing himself a wary disputant 'as Cleophon did in the Mandrobulus.'

Welcker's notion that the Cleophon of the *Sophistici Elenchi* is identical with the Athenian demagogue of the same name is, as we now must see, a chronological impossibility. It is conceivable that the Cleophon of the *Mandrobulus* was the same person as the tragic poet of *Suidas*, just as the latter may have been the same as the epic poet of the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*; but the identity would be in the absence of fresh data very difficult to prove, and it seems to me that we have not gained much by the unverified and unverifiable assertions in which writers on this obscure little chapter of Greek literary history have so freely indulged.

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